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REVIVING THE CRIMINAL JURY IN
JAPAN
LESTER W. KISS*
I
INTRODUCTION
The last decade has spawned a reexamination of the effectiveness of the
1
jury system in the United States. Jury verdicts rendered in certain highly publicized trials have shocked the public and caused journalists and scholars alike
2
to criticize juries as ill-equipped to handle the cases before them. Some critics
have even questioned the basic role of the jury as an instrument of democracy
3
and a form of sovereignty of the people. To counter this criticism, others argue that the intense attack on the jury system by scholars and journalists is a result of disgust with unexpected verdicts and is not based on empirical evidence
about the system, which shows that juries reach a defensible decision most of
4
the time.
Despite the ongoing debate about the effectiveness of the American jury,
several countries have recently adopted or are seriously considering adopting
5
their own jury systems. One of the more heated debates about adopting a jury
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1. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. ALDER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM
(1994) (contending that a jury system that works as badly as our system should not and will not survive); Marcus A. Brown, Commentary: Trial by Jury—An Obsolete Concept, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 109 (Winter 1995) (arguing that jury trial should be eliminated in criminal cases and reduced in
civil cases in the interests of time, cost, and justice); Tamar Jacoby & Tim Padgett, Waking up the Jury
Box, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1989, at 51, 51 (“A growing number of legal scholars think the [jury] reforms
will make for more reliable, accurate verdicts.”).
2. See, e.g., Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases,
85 NW. U. L. REV. 190 (1990); see also ALDER, supra note 1; Brown, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 927 (1994) (“Only a shadow of this communitarian institution
[the jury] has survived into the urbanized America of the late twentieth century.”).
4. For representative research bearing on criminal juries, see JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL
MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS (1979); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
(1966); Neil Vidmar et al., Should We Rush to Reform the Criminal Jury?, 80 JUDICATURE 286 (1997).
Research on civil juries has produced some of the most solid data indicating that juries do their jobs
reliably and responsibly, even in complex cases. See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
AND THE AMERICAN JURY (1995); Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock
After Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
5. Spain and Russia are among the countries that recently adopted a jury system. See Stephen C.
Thaman, Europe’s New Jury Systems: The Cases of Spain and Russia, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
233 (Spring 1999). See also generally Advertising Campaign Used to Introduce Jury Trials to Spain,
EUROMARKETING, Oct. 31, 1995, available in 1995 WL 11652377; Hon. Steven R. Plotkin, The Jury
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6

system is occurring in Japan. Because Japan actually used a jury system for
7
criminal trials from 1928 to 1943, the present-day debate focuses mainly on re8
adopting the jury for criminal cases only.
The purpose of this article is to analyze whether the readoption of criminal
jury trials in present-day Japan would be feasible from cultural, societal, and
legal viewpoints in light of Japan’s prior experience with a jury system. Part II
of the article briefly considers why reversion to trial by jury is being considered
by Japanese lawyers and judges. Part III describes the jury system used in Japan from 1928 to 1943 and the problems with the system that caused its suspension. Part IV examines the two main types of layperson juries used in other
countries. Part V considers the broad question of whether the adoption of one
of the jury systems examined in Part IV would be feasible in Japan from cultural, societal, and legal viewpoints.
II
WHY THE DEBATE ABOUT TRIAL BY JURY?
Just as in the United States, where certain seemingly outrageous jury verdicts have fueled the fire of criticism of the jury system, a similar phenomenon
has occurred in Japan regarding its judge-based system. Examples of such
highly publicized verdicts by judges include the acquittals of four death row
inmates who were imprisoned for over twenty-five years before obtaining new
9
trials.
Two of these controversial cases are Government v. Akabori (the Shimada
10
11
Case) and Government v. Menda (the Menda Case). In the Shimada case,

Trial in Russia, 2 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1994); Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial by
Jury in Russia, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 61 (1995); Tunku Varadarajan, A Jury System Under Question,
TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 18, 1997, at 43. Japan is considering readopting its jury system for criminal
trials. See Richard Lempert, A Jury for Japan?, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 37, 38-39 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Kaneyoshi Hagiwara, Sueiden keisanshin o kangaeru [Considering the Criminal Assessor System of Sweden], 48 JIYU TO SEIGI [Liberty and Justice] 114 (1997); Takeshi Nishimura, Keiji
baishin saiban—200X nen, nihon de [Criminal Jury Trials—in Japan in the Year 200X?], 48 JIYU TO
SEIGI [Liberty and Justice] 92 (1997); Hiroshi Sato, Naze nihon ni sanshinsei o ka [Why Should Japan
Adopt the Assessor System?], 48 JIYU TO SEIGI [Liberty and Justice] 108 (1997); Satoru Shinomiya,
Naze nihon ni baishinsei o ka [Why Should Japan Adopt the Jury System?], 48 JIYU TO SEIGI [Liberty
and Justice] 102 (1997).
7. See Baishinho [Jury Act], Law No. 50 of 1923; Baishinho no Teishi ni Kansuru Horitsu [An
Act to Suspend the Jury Act], Law No. 88 of 1943.
8. However, some scholars have examined the possibility of adopting the jury system for civil
cases. See, e.g., Ichiro Kato, The Concerns of Japanese Tort Law Today, 1 LAW IN JAPAN: AN
ANNUAL 65, 91 (1967); Lempert, supra note 4, at 37.
9. See Daniel H. Foote, From Japan’s Death Row to Freedom, 1 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 11-13
(1992); Toyoji Saito, “Substitute Prison”: A Hotbed of False Criminal Charges in Japan, in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 507, 508-09 (Kenneth L. Port ed., 1996).
10. Government v. Akabori (the Shimada Case), 1316 HANREI JIHO 21 (Shizuoka Dist. Ct., Jan.
31, 1989). The description of this case is based on the district court decision and Professor Foote’s detailed English-language account of the court’s decision. See Foote, supra note 9, at 50-63.
11. Government v. Menda (the Menda Case), 1090 HANREI JIHO 21 (Kumamoto Dist. Ct., July
15, 1983). For an in-depth account of this case, see Foote, supra note 9, at 14-19.
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Masao Akabori was arrested in May 1954 for the rape and murder of a school12
girl in Shimada City, Shizuoka Prefecture. After intense questioning by the
13
police, Akabori confessed to the rape and murder. After a four-year trial,
14
Akabori was convicted and sentenced to death in May 1958. His direct ap15
16
peals to the Tokyo High Court and Supreme Court were fruitless. Twentyfive years later, the Tokyo High Court overturned the Shizuoka District Court
17
ruling rejecting a retrial request and remanded the case to the district court.
18
The district court granted a new trial on May 29, 1986. After nearly a two19
year trial, the Shizuoka District Court acquitted Akabori on January 31, 1989.
The district court acquitted on the ground that there was no evidence linking
Akabori to the crime other than his own confessions, which were shown to be
20
of little reliability.
In the Menda case, Sakae Menda was charged with the hatchet murder of a
seventy-six-year old prayer reader and his wife in Hitoyoshi City, Kumamoto
21
Prefecture. Menda confessed to the crime a few days later after detailed ques22
tioning. After a year-long trial in the Kumamoto District Court, Menda was
23
found guilty of the murders and sentenced to death on March 23, 1950. The
24
25
Fukuoka High Court and the Supreme Court upheld the verdict on direct
appeal. In 1975, after numerous failed attempts at obtaining a retrial, Menda
26
was successful when the Fukuoka High Court granted his request. The Kumamoto District Court acquitted Menda of both murders on July 15, 1983, ap-

12. See 1316 HANREI JIHO at 31.
13. See id.
14. See Foote, supra note 9, at 55-56 (citing Government v. Akabori (the Shimada Incident),
(Shizuoka Dist. Ct., May 23, 1958), reprinted in Keiji saishin seido kenkyukai [Study Group on the
Criminal Retrial System], Chomei saishin jiken mikokan saibanreishu daiishu [Unpublished Court Decisions in Famous Retrial Cases] at 133 [hereinafter Mikokan saibanreishu]).
15. Id. (citing Government v. Akabori (the Shimada Incident), (Tokyo High Ct., Feb. 16, 1960),
reprinted in Mikokan saibanreishu, supra note 14, at 144).
16. Id. (citing Government v. Akabori (The Shimada Incident), (Sup. Ct., Dec. 15, 1960), reprinted
in Mikokan saibanreishu, supra note 14, at 151).
17. 1316 HANREI JIHO at 26.
18. Government v. Akabori (the Shimada Incident), 1193 H ANREI JIHO 31 (Shizuoka Dist. Ct.,
May 29, 1986).
19. See 1316 HANREI JIHO 21.
20. See id. at 51.
21. See Government v. Menda (the Menda Case), 1090 HANREI JIHO 21 (Kumamoto Dist. Ct.,
July 15, 1983).
22. See id. at 85.
23. See Foote, supra note 9, at 19-21 (citing Government v. Menda (the Menda Incident),
(Kumamoto Dist. Ct., Yatsuhiro Div., Mar. 23, 1950), reprinted in Mikokan saibanreishu, supra note
14, at 1).
24. See id. (citing Government v. Menda (the Menda Incident), (Fukuoka High Ct., Mar. 19,
1951), reprinted in Mikokan saibanreishu, supra note 14, at 3).
25. See id. (citing Government v. Menda (the Menda Incident), (Sup. Ct., Dec. 25, 1951), reprinted
in Mikokan saibanreishu, supra note 14, at 5).
26. See id. at 22.

KISS.FMT3.DOC

264

08/02/99 4:11 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 62: No. 2

27

proximately thirty-three years after he was convicted. In its ruling, the court
28
rejected Menda’s confessions because it found them to be unreliable.
The roots of the debate on the readoption of the jury trial, however, go far
deeper than a mere reaction to erroneous verdicts by judges. Although, in theory, the Japanese criminal justice system provides criminal defendants a wide
29
set of legal protections, in reality, these protections are diminished by the
practices of judges and prosecutors. In particular, there are questions as to
30
whether judges are effective finders of fact. Proponents of the jury system argue that, in reality, criminal defendants are convicted before the trial even be31
gins. Prosecutors conduct the factfinding and draw legal conclusions, and
32
judges simply “rubber stamp” their results. A jury would be a better finder of
fact because juries, unlike judges, do not hear cases on a daily basis and would
not simply accept the decision of the prosecutor. Theoretically, juries would be
more inclined than a judge would be to listen to the evidence and deliver a fair
33
verdict.
An area that illustrates the poor factfinding that can occur in a Japanese
34
courtroom is the judges’ ready acceptance of “voluntary confessions” of
criminal defendants. It is doubtful whether such confessions, which occur with
35
great frequency, are truly voluntary. Under the Japanese system, police often
have unrestricted power to interrogate a suspect, and many cases of abuse have

27. See 1090 HANREI JIHO at 21.
28. See id. at 63.
29. See Jean Choi Desombre, Comparing the Notions of the Japanese and the U.S. Criminal Justice
System: An Examination of Pre-Trial Rights of the Criminally Accused in Japan and the United States,
14 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 103, 107-08 (1995); B.J. George, Jr., Rights of the Criminally Accused, 53
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 71 (Spring 1990).
30. See Takeo Ishimatsu, Can Criminal Judges Be Said to Be Judging?, 22 LAW IN JAPAN: AN
ANNUAL 143 (1989).
31. See id.
32. See Lempert, supra note 4, at 39. Support put forth for this theory usually begins with the
statement that the conviction rate in Japan is about 99.8%. See Foote, supra note 9, at 81. This unusually high rate of conviction demonstrates that prosecutors must have an extremely high level of suspicion to indict, a suspicion so high that they are certain that the defendant is guilty. See id. at 76. Such a
practice can only encourage judges to presume guilt when the case finally gets to trial, countering the
presumption of innocence embodied in Japanese law. See id. at 81. Professor Foote quotes one former
judge as stating,
In general, there is a feeling from the outset that the defendant is guilty. On top of that, when
there is a long trial focusing on whether or not the defendant is guilty, it’s troublesome for
judges, who face demands to dispose of cases promptly. . . . Moreover, when a judge issues an
acquittal, the faces of his superiors and the displeased faces of prosecutors with whom he’s
become friendly will appear in his mind.
Id. The term “prosecutor justice” (kensatsukan shiho), which is often seen in the literature, stems from
this theory. See Ryuichi Hirano, Diagnosis of the Current Code of Criminal Procedure, 22 LAW IN
JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 129, 131 (1989).
33. During the period when Japan had a jury system, the acquittal rate was 15.4% for defendants
who chose jury trial as compared to rates between 1.3% and 3.7% for those who chose bench trials.
See Foote, supra note 9, at 84.
34. According to Professor Foote, “[a]n emphasis on obtaining confessions remains at the heart of
Japan’s criminal justice system.” Id. at 86.
35. See Hirano, supra note 32, at 137.
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36

been reported.
Japanese authorities often demand detailed, corroborated
37
38
confessions. Such confessions may then be presented at trial, and although
they may be attacked by the defendant and defense counsel in court, their corroboration gives judges a basis to accept them even if they are procedurally
39
questionable.
One reason for such easy acceptance of confessions by judges is a peculiar40
ity of trial practice in Japan called “trial by dossier.” The confession is submitted to the court in the form of a confession statement which becomes part of
a dossier. Judges then read the dossiers and often form factual conclusions in
their chambers or homes rather than in open court after having heard wit41
nesses. This practice is problematic because the manner of speech and demeanor of witnesses and of the defendant can have a strong influence on the
42
finder of fact; if these elements are not fully considered, the defendant may
not be receiving a fair trial. Proponents of the jury system argue that because
there is little hope of judges agreeing to eliminate trial by dossier, the only solution is a switch to an American-style jury system where factual conclusions are
43
formed only after testimony in open court.
Also inhibiting effective factfinding by the Japanese judiciary is that most
44
judges are career judges with little experience in the outside world. One can
become a judge after passing the extremely rigorous National Legal Examina45
tion (shiho shiken), followed by two years of practical training. The person
46
then has the choice of becoming either a judge, a prosecutor, or an attorney.

36. See Saito, supra note 9, at 508. Such abuse usually comes in the form of indirect techniques
and psychological pressure rather than direct physical violence. See Hirano, supra note 32, at 137. For
example, in the Menda Case, prosecutors questioned Menda for almost 80 hours and did not allow him
to sleep. See Foote, supra note 9, at 65. In the Shimada Case, Akabori was questioned from dawn to
dusk for a number of days. See id. at 53.
37. See Hirano, supra note 32, at 135. In contrast to the Japanese case, in the United States, in
most cases, simple confessions that only summarize the facts of a crime will suffice. See id. The problem with requiring detailed confessions is that it forces Japanese prosecutors to conduct lengthy interrogations. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 138.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 142.
44. See Takeshi Kojima, Japanese Civil Procedure in a Comparative Law Perspective, 46 U. KAN.
L. REV. 687 n.12 (1998).
45. See Edward I. Chen, The National Law Examination of Japan, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1 (1989).
The practical training occurs at the Legal Training and Research Institute, which limits the number of
successful applicants to approximately 500. See id. at 7. In recent years, less than three percent of
those who took the National Legal Examination passed. See Mark A. Behrens & Daniel H. Raddock,
Japan’s New Product Liability Law: The Citadel of Strict Liability Falls, but Access to Recovery Is Limited by Formidable Barriers, 16 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 669, 677-78 (1995). Only summary court judges
and five of 15 Supreme Court Justices are appointed without first being qualified for admission to the
bar. See Mamoru Urabe, Wagakuni ni okeru baishin sai ban no kenkyu [A Study on Trial by Jury in
Japan], in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 482, 482 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976).
46. See Chen, supra note 45, at 1.
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The result is a highly educated, well-trained elite group of jurists who may have
47
attitudes and experiences quite different from those of the general public.
This limited range of life experience may negatively affect the factfinding abilities of these judges.
The idea of readopting the jury system has come to the forefront of possible
reforms of the criminal justice system in Japan. Japanese organizations have
already conducted in-depth studies of foreign jury systems. For example, a
subcommittee of the Osaka Bar Association’s Committee for Judicial System
Reform toured the United States, Great Britain, and Germany to study citizen
48
participation in the trial process, and the Supreme Court of Japan sent several
judges to the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France to study
49
juries.
III
THE JURY SYSTEM IN JAPAN FROM 1928 TO 1943
50

Japan adopted a jury system on April 18, 1923. Although enacted in 1923,
the law did not take effect until 1928, and it stayed in effect for fifteen years un51
til it was suspended on April 1, 1943.
Before devising a jury system appropriate for Japan, the Japanese government investigated trial systems in France, Germany, England, and the United
52
States. The result was a uniquely Japanese jury system complementing an
53
otherwise Continental European system of criminal procedure. Therefore, although the Japanese system was influenced by the Anglo-American model of
jury trial, it differed in many important respects.
First, not all defendants were entitled to a jury trial. The only cases for
which a jury trial was guaranteed were those in which the maximum penalty
54
was death or imprisonment for life or where the maximum penalty was imprisonment for greater than three years and the minimum penalty was impris55
onment for not less than one year. In death penalty or life imprisonment
56
cases, the law provided trial by jury unless waived by the accused. In all other
eligible cases, the law provided for trial by jury only if the accused specifically
47. See Lempert, supra note 4, at 48.
48. See id. at 38.
49. See id. at 38-39. The Supreme Court of Japan has also published a book entitled WAGAKUNI
DE OKONOWARETA BAISHIN SEIDO [The Old Jury System in Japan], which is a compilation of works
on the jury system used in Japan from 1928-43.
50. See Baishinho [Jury Act], Law No. 50 of 1923.
51. See Baishinho no Teishi ni Kansuru Horitsu [An Act to Suspend the Jury Act], Law No. 88 of
1943.
52. See Lempert, supra note 4, at 37 n.1.
53. See Urabe, supra note 45, at 483. More specifically, the Japanese laws in 1923 were based on
the German civil law and a constitution modeled after the Prussian Constitution. See Behrens & Raddock, supra note 45, at 673-74.
54. See Baishinho [Jury Act], Law No. 50 of 1923, art. 2.
55. See id. art. 3.
56. See id.
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requested a jury trial. Furthermore, the law provided that certain crimes were
58
not triable by jury. These crimes included crimes against a member of the imperial family, riot with the purpose of overthrowing the government, violation
of the Peace Preservation Act (Chian Iji-ho), espionage, and violation of laws
59
concerning the election of public officials.
Second, the Japanese jury did not return a general verdict of “guilty” or
“not guilty.” Instead, it responded to questions submitted by the judge (toshin)
60
and related to the existence of facts. These answers were based on the views
61
of a majority of the requisite twelve jurors.
62
Third, the jurors’ responses were not binding. The court, upon finding the
jury’s answer unwarranted, could disregard it, call another jury, and submit the
63
case anew.
Jury selection resembled the jury selection methods used in the AngloAmerican system at that time. The pool of prospective jurors included “male
citizens over thirty years of age who had resided in the same city, town or village for two years or longer, who paid not less than three yen in national direct
64
tax for the preceding two consecutive years, and who were literate.”
65
The number of jury trials in Japan decreased drastically from 1928 to 1943.
The annual number of cases tried by jury was greatest in 1929, when 143 cases
66
were put to juries. The number dropped to sixty-six the next year and de67
creased annually until, in 1942, only two jury trials were held. A total of 611
68
defendants chose jury trials during the fifteen years the system operated. Of
69
these, ninety-four were acquitted. Why did the use of the jury system decline
so precipitously during its lifetime?
One reason put forth for the decline of the jury system over this period was
70
the political climate in the late 1920s to 1943. The Jury Act was enacted in
71
1923 during the period known as “Taisho Democracy.” It was primarily be57. See id. Note that a jury trial was not available for crimes such as simple theft, embezzlement,
gambling, adultery, and obscenity because the punishment for these crimes did not fall within the parameters set out in the Act. See Urabe, supra note 45, at 484 n.h.
58. See Urabe, supra note 45, at 484.
59. See id. (citing Baishinho [Jury Act], Law No. 50 of 1923, art. 4).
60. See Baishinho [Jury Act], Law No. 50 of 1923, art. 88.
61. See id. art. 91.
62. See id. art. 95.
63. See id. In the United States, a judge in a civil trial can overrule the jury’s verdict and grant a
motion for a “judgment notwithstanding the verdict” regardless of the jury’s verdict; however, in a
criminal trial, the judge can only enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of acquittal,
thereby reversing the jury’s conviction. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 50, with FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c).
64. Urabe, supra note 45, at 484 (citing Baishinho [Jury Act], Law No. 50 of 1923, arts. 12, 23, 27).
65. See id. at 485.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Foote, supra note 9, at 84.
69. See id.
70. See Urabe, supra note 45, at 487 (citing Nobuyoshi Toshitani, Minshu to Horitsuka [The
Populace and Lawyers], in 6 GENDAI NO HORISUKA [Contemporary Lawyers] 387-89 (1966)).
71. See id.
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cause of this nationwide movement toward democracy that Premier Takashi
Hara was able to sponsor the Act successfully and allow Japanese citizens an
72
opportunity to participate directly in the justice system. However, by the time
the jury system was first used in 1928, the political climate in Japan was moving
73
toward fascism. By 1928, a great number of the members of the Communist
Party were arrested, and by 1935 the basic “organ theory of the Emperor”
74
(Tenno Kikan-setsu) was suppressed.
This political and cultural environment of rising militarism and fascism
countered the rise of the jury system because it encouraged the bourgeoisie to
75
waive the right to trial by jury and prohibited access to trial by jury to those
who most needed it: criminal defendants who adhered to communist and so76
cialist ideologies. Both of the main classes of society, therefore, had no concern about the fate of the jury system because they either did not care to use it
or were not permitted to use it. Hence, any possible strengths of the jury sys77
tem were lost under the “fierce storm of fascism.”
Another reason put forth for the decline of the jury system in Japan was the
content of the Jury Act itself. Many Japanese scholars observe that it is not
surprising that the jury system failed in Japan because the drafters of the Act
seemed to have built in various devices to prevent the smooth working of the
78
system. The most important of these is the judge’s ability to disregard the
79
jury’s answers, seat a new jury, and try the case de novo. The drafters of the
Act may have included this provision because they believed that it would be
contrary to the judge’s responsibility to decide each case if he or she had to give
80
binding effect to the jury’s answers. This provision effectively undermined
any true power of the jury system and allowed judges to continue to make the
final decisions on guilt and innocence. Criminal defendants quickly learned
that acquittal by a jury had little meaning, and they would often waive their

72. See id. at 483.
73. See id. at 487 (citing Toshitani, supra note 70).
74. See id. Urabe explains that the “organ theory of the Emperor” was a constitutional theory under which sovereignty resided in the nation, and the Meiji Emperor was an organ of this sovereign
body exercising state powers. The suppression of this theory is an example of the move toward fascism. See id.
75. See id. The bourgeoisie waived trial by jury because they feared their unpopularity would
work against them through the jury. See id.
76. See id. Trial by jury was not available in these cases, known as shiso jiken (thought cases) because no crime of a political nature could be tried by jury. See Baishinho [Jury Act], Law No. 50 of
1923, art. 4.
77. See Urabe, supra note 45, at 487-88 (citing Toshitani, supra note 70).
78. See id. (stating that one should not feel surprised at the failure of the jury system but rather by
the remarkable success of various devices which were built into the system to prevent the smooth
working of trial by jury in Japan); Kitaro Saito, Baishin [Jury], in KEIJI HOGAKU JITEN [Dictionary of
Criminal Law] 62 (Y. Takigawa ed., 1957) (stating that if the framer of the Jury Act had respected trial
by jury, he would have provided that almost all criminal cases were to be tried by jury).
79. See Baishinho [Jury Act], Law No. 50 of 1923, art. 91.
80. See Urabe, supra note 45, at 490.
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right to a jury trial from the start or simply not elect trial by jury if given the
81
choice.
Jury trials also cost criminal defendants more money and deprived them of
82
the possibility of bringing a koso appeal on points of fact. Because the sentence of a convicted criminal was usually mitigated upon appeal, criminal defense attorneys understandably would encourage their defendants to preserve
83
the right to this appeal, even if it meant waiving the right to jury trial.
Furthermore, public prosecutors could avoid any request by the accused for
a jury trial because the law provided that jury trial was available only if the case
84
underwent a “preliminary investigation” (yoshin).
Finally, the Jury Act did not allow objections to the judge’s instructions to
85
the jury. Attorneys and public prosecutors often criticized the instructions
given by the judge as “soliciting answers which would lead to the guilt of the
86
accused.” Even if the jury did return its special verdicts to the effect that the
defendant was not guilty, there was still a great chance that the judge would call
for a new trial. Such obstacles frustrated attorneys, sometimes to the point
where they would prefer to waive jury trial as a way of expressing piety to the
87
authority of the judge in hopes of leniency in sentencing.
The final factor considered to have led to the unpopularity of the Japanese
jury is Japanese culture. Japanese society is often described as “vertical” or
“hierarchical,” meaning that social relationships are governed by the relative
“status” of the parties. This “status” is often determined by, among other factors, age and occupation. The hierarchy that exists in Japanese society is evi88
denced by the Japanese language, by the act of bowing that occurs between
89
persons just introduced, and by the seating at formal occasions.
Many scholars are convinced that as a result of the hierarchy in Japanese
society, the Japanese people prefer trial by “those above the people” rather
than by “their fellows,” and that this caused the Japanese to distrust juries from
90
the beginning. People trust judges because they have a special sense of responsibility when adjudicating cases and try to keep their moral standards high

81. See Saito, supra note 78.
82. See id. However, such a defendant was entitled to bring a jokoku appeal on points of law to
the highest court. See Urabe, supra note 45, at 491.
83. See id.
84. See H. Kikuchi, Baishin Seido ni Tsuite [On the Jury System], 14 NIHON HORITSUKA KYOKAI
Series 57 (1959).
85. See Baishinho [Jury Act], Law No. 50 of 1923, art. 78.
86. See Urabe, supra note 45, at 490.
87. See id. at 488.
88. The Japanese language has formal and informal forms for all verbs and certain nouns. When
speaking to a “superior,” a Japanese will resort to the formal form, generally called keigo.
89. The “inferior” person should bow lower. “Inferiority” is determined by factors such as age,
rank, and occupation.
90. Ryuichi Hirano, Shokugyo Saibankan to Shiroto Saibankan [Professional Judges and Lay
Judges], 29 HORITSU JIHO 435, 437 (1957); see also Christopher A. Ford, The Indigenization of Constitutionalism in the Japanese Experience, 28 CASE W. RES J. INT’L L. 3, 62 n. 159 (1996).
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91

in order to ensure impartial trials. Therefore, citizen participation in the judicial process is ultimately not suitable for the Japanese people because citizens
would simply prefer to have a judge decide their case rather than their fellow
citizens. Scholars disagree on exactly how much weight should be given to the
cultural aspect of the failure of the jury system in Japan, but most agree culture
played some part.
The failure of the jury system in Japan can be attributed to numerous factors. First, the fascist political climate that arose in Japan just as the jury system began to be used caused many of those charged with political crimes to desire a trial by jury, but did not allow them to have it. Second, inherent defects
in the Jury Act prevented the jury system from gaining respect. Finally, Japanese respect for authority caused the Japanese people to prefer trial by experienced and honest judges rather than trial by their peers.
IV
TYPES OF JURY SYSTEMS
If Japan decided to reintroduce a jury system, it would have to ensure that
the new system avoided the systemic defects of the old. This would entail
making jury verdicts binding, allowing defendants who elect jury trial to appeal
just as if they had elected nonjury trial, ensuring that election of trial by jury
would not be more expensive for the defendant, and allowing defendants to
object to the trial judge’s jury instructions.
Once these basic facets of any serious jury system were adopted, the Japanese would have to decide exactly what form the new jury system would take.
The old system could serve as a template; juries could be composed of twelve
private citizens who rendered majority special verdicts. However, because of
the negative aspects associated with the previous jury system, the Japanese are
examining all possibilities, including the mixed court system of laypersons and
92
professional judges. This section examines the two models of jury systems
that could be implemented in Japan: the Anglo-American jury composed completely of laypersons, and the Continental mixed court composed of both
judges and laypersons.
A. The Anglo-American Jury System
A criminal jury in the Anglo-American system is composed of six to twelve
93
jurors selected at random from the local population. Such a jury can convict

91. See Hirano, supra note 90, at 437.
92. See Sato, supra note 6.
93. In the U.S. system, the Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), held that a
six-person jury in a state criminal case did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Most
states, however, provide 12-person juries in capital cases. See RICHARDSON R. LYNN, JURY TRIAL
LAW AND PRACTICE 15 (1986). The sources for the jury pool include public documents such as phone
books and voter registration lists. See id. at 41.
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or acquit based on either majority or unanimous verdicts. Although the goals
of the jury system are numerous, one goal seems to be most important: “The
power to condemn citizens to criminal sanctions is potentially so dangerous
95
that it ought not to be left entirely to the hirelings of the state.” As Justice
White wrote in Duncan v. Louisiana,
[t]hose who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies
and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The framers of the
constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary, but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action.96

Other purposes behind the Anglo-American jury system are to ensure fairness through group decisionmaking, to promote simplicity and better factfinding through lay reasoning and skills, and to allow criminal defendants to be
97
judged by their peers.
Unlike judges, laymen have no connection to the
criminal justice system other than the fact that they are serving as jurors and
98
therefore lack incentive to abuse their power or misuse the system.
B. The Continental Mixed Court
The second version of the jury system being considered by the Japanese is
the mixed court system, in which laypersons and professional judges sit together in a single panel that deliberates and decides on all issues of verdict and
sentence. This mixed court system is widespread in Europe for cases of serious
99
crime. Because the system has been most widely employed in Germany, the
rest of this section will look specifically at the German system.
100
For
There are two kinds of mixed courts in modern German practice.
more serious crimes, the mixed court consists of five “judges”—two lay and
101
three professional (“two-three court”). For less serious crimes, the court con102
sists of three “judges”—two lay and one professional (“two-one court”). Any
103
decision that disadvantages the accused requires a two-thirds majority vote.
This means that in the two-three court, four of the five judges must agree on a
104
verdict of conviction, giving the two laymen a veto power if they act to-

94. While unanimous verdicts are still required in federal courts, states are permitted to utilize
nonunanimous verdicts. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1974) (holding that neither the Sixth
nor the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the states the requirement of unanimous criminal verdicts).
95. See John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the
American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195, 209.
96. 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
97. See Langbein, supra note 95, at 209.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 195.
100. See id. at 198.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 198-99.
103. See id. at 199 (citing § 263(1) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure).
104. See id.
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105

gether.
In the two-one court, the two-thirds voting rule allows the two lay106
men either to convict or acquit over the opposition of the professional. Thus,
depending on whether the trial is for a serious or minor crime, laymen will have
varying power in the decisionmaking process.
When the trial is over, the mixed court begins deliberations. However, unlike the Anglo-American jury, “the presiding judge (the only professional in
the two-one court and the senior professional in the two-three court) ‘leads’
107
these in camera proceedings and ‘puts the questions and takes the votes.’”
This safeguards against the laymen making decisions based on ignorance or
bias.
The mixed court system has safeguards against the inexperience of the laypersons. The selection of lay judges is much less random than the selection of
jurors in the Anglo-American system. Lay judges are selected for four-year
terms, and the selection process is divided into a nomination and a selection
108
phase. German studies on the nomination practices of local authorities have
109
revealed wide variations in practice.
Some authorities compile random lists
of residents, others delegate the task to the political parties represented on the
110
city counsel, and still others vigorously seek out volunteers. Some authorities
111
even allow the police to exercise a veto power over the provisional list. In the
selection phase, a “selection commission” chooses the new lay judges from the
112
pool of nominees. The number chosen varies from year to year depending on
the expected caseload. Considerable variation exists in the functioning of these
commissions, and in many cases political parties have a large influence in the
113
process. While it is clear that a goal of the system is for the list of nominees
114
to be representative of “all groups in the population,” neither the statutory
procedures nor the practices of the local authorities and commissions bears this
115
out. The end result is that lay judges often have educational and social backgrounds more similar to professional judges, which may diminish the effectiveness of the lay role in the mixed court system.

See id.
See id. at 200-01.
Id. at 200 (citing § 194(1) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure).
See id. at 206.
See id. (citing EKKEHARD KLAUSA, EHRENAMTLICHE RICHTER: IHRE AUSWAHL UND
FUNKTION, EMPIRISCH UNTERSUCHT 23-46 (1972)).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 207. Langbein explains that “[t]he selection commission is chaired by a judge and
contains, in addition to an administrator from the state government, ten citizens chosen by the elected
local governments within the judicial district.” Id.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 208 (citing § 36(2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure).
115. See id.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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V
WOULD A JURY SYSTEM WORK IN JAPAN FROM A CULTURAL, SOCIETAL,
AND LEGAL VIEWPOINT?
A. Japanese Culture
“Culture” is defined as “the customary beliefs, social norms, and material
116
traits of a racial, religious, or social group.” By definition, therefore, culture
is a generalization of the beliefs, social norms, and traits of most members of a
certain group. When discussing Japanese culture, one must remember that not
every Japanese person will act in accordance with the cultural traits de117
scribed. A generalization of Japanese behavior patterns based on sociological evidence can nevertheless serve as a useful tool in analyzing the probable
success of a jury system in Japan.
The hierarchical nature of Japanese society is difficult to miss. The language and behavior one Japanese person exhibits when meeting another for the
118
first time is largely governed by the place each has in Japanese society. This
is true both in the business and personal contexts. In the business context, once
business cards are exchanged and each person has determined the status of the
other, each person can adapt his language and behavior to the situation. For
example, if person A is a department head while person B is a new employee,
person A would speak in neutral Japanese while person B would speak in ex119
tremely polite Japanese. Similarly, in the personal context, a student would
use honorific Japanese toward a professor, and a younger person would use
similar honorific language toward an elder. In every personal interaction,
therefore, the relative status of the participants influences how they behave.
Many scholars have pointed out that the Japanese have a higher level of
trust for authority figures than do other societies. Such scholars often state as a
120
basis of this trust the Confucian tradition in Japan. They argue that this trust
of authority is exemplified by the average Japanese citizen’s lack of interest in
politics and by his apathy for provoking change in a system with which he is
frustrated.
The shudan-ishiki, or “group consciousness,” of the Japanese is also a cultural trait that could have profound effects on the actual functioning of the jury
116. MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 191 (New ed. 1994).
117. This is especially true of younger generations of Japanese, many of whom have lived abroad
and have adopted elements of foreign cultures into their own lives.
118. To determine this hierarchy, the Japanese often exchange meshi (business cards) or explain
their position when meeting each other.
119. Almost all verbs in Japanese can be transformed into the humble form, the polite form, or the
neutral form. One of the most difficult aspects of learning Japanese for Americans is that the type of
Japanese used must always be adjusted according to the identity of the listener.
120. See Dan Fenno Henderson, Security Markets in the United States and Japan: Distinctive Aspects
Molded by Cultural, Social, Economic, and Political Differences, 14 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
263, 295 (1991).
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system in Japan. Chie Nakane is a leading scholar on the issue of Japanese
group consciousness, and her framework for discussing this issue is useful.
Nakane uses two basic criteria to define group consciousness—“frame” and
121
“attribute.”
Frame is “a locality, an institution, or a particular relationship
which binds a set of individuals into one group; in all cases it indicates a criterion which sets out a boundary and gives a common basis to a set of individuals
122
who are located or involved in it.” Attribute is a personal characteristic such
123
as a descent group or caste that can define a group.
According to Nakane,
Japanese group consciousness is based more on frame than attribute. For example, when a Japanese confronts another person and affixes some position to
himself socially, he is inclined to give precedence to institution over kind of oc124
cupation; “rather than saying ‘I am a type-setter’ or ‘I am a publisher,’ he is
125
likely to say, ‘I am from B Publishing Group.’”
Nakane concludes that the
criterion by which Japanese classify individuals socially tends to be that of par126
ticular institution rather than that of universal attribute.
The institution to
which one belongs, therefore, becomes almost the sole criterion for defining
one’s group. This is why accounts of Japanese companies building towns for
their employees, organizing group vacations for their employees, and in extreme cases, having common graves for their employees, have been prevalent in
127
the literature.
Maintenance of harmony in the group is another important aspect of Japanese culture. Scholars such as Takeyoshi Kawashima believe that Japanese society functions effectively only because of the high degree of interpersonal
128
harmony maintained therein.
A natural result is that strong, contradictory
personal opinions by inferiors are not voiced. Nakane describes such a phenomenon in the Japanese family “group”:
[I]n the ideal traditional household in Japan, opinions of the members of the household should always be held unanimously regardless of the issue, and this normally
meant that all members accepted the opinion of the household head, without even
discussing the issue. An expression of a contradictory opinion contrary to the head
was considered a sign of misbehavior, disturbing the harmony of the group order.129

It is difficult to say just how true Nakane’s statement would be if applied
outside of the family context. However, a family is similar to any other type of

121. CHIE NAKANE, JAPANESE SOCIETY (1970), reprinted in JAPANESE CULTURE AND
HAVIOR: SELECTED READINGS 155 (Takie Sigiyama Lebra & William P. Lebra eds., 1974).

BE-

122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 156.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 163.
128. See Takeyoshi Kawashima, Nihonjin no Hoishiki [The Legal Consciousness of the Japanese]
(1967); see also Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN
41 (A. Von Mehren ed., 1963).
129. NAKANE, supra note 121, reprinted in JAPANESE CULTURE AND BEHAVIOR: SELECTED
READINGS, supra note 121, at 165.
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closely knit group, and the goal of maintaining harmony in both could have the
same effect.
1. Mixed Court Proposal. The adoption of a mixed court in Japan is
problematic. First, because of the hierarchical nature of Japanese society and
the Japanese respect for authority, the danger exists that the professional judge
or judges would have more than simply their intended “guiding” influence over
the laypersons. Certainly, laypersons in any country are respectful of those
130
above them, but respecting a higher authority does not mean subordinating
one’s views to please that authority. In Japanese culture, however, respect for
higher authority combined with a desire to maintain harmony and avoid
confrontation may result in listening and adopting for oneself what that
131
authority has to say.
Because of this, the layperson juror in a mixed court
system in Japan may have difficulty voicing any personal beliefs about the
132
case.
Also because a mixed court system contains at least one professional
judge, overcoming this problem requires limiting the participation of the judge,
which would lead to the Anglo-American jury system.
Furthermore, even if the laypersons were told that they should speak their
minds and independently determine the outcome of the case, there is no way of
knowing whether a conscious decision to abandon one’s cultural instincts could
be effective. For example, because it is impolite in Japanese culture to blatantly disagree with a superior (on the principle of maintenance of harmony),
how far would a layperson go in voicing disagreement with a professional
judge’s opinion even after being told he must do so? The layperson would possibly speak up once or twice, but if the judge did not somehow reinforce the
viewpoint, only a courageous Japanese juror would press the issue. For these
reasons, the adoption of a mixed court system in Japan seems to be undesirable
compared to the adoption of a modified Anglo-American jury system.
2. Anglo-American Proposal. The adoption of an all-layperson jury system
modeled on that in the United States would be preferable in Japan because it
would create the largest chance for full participation of all jurors. Although the
cultural concepts of hierarchy and respect for authority would still play a role in
the jury’s decisionmaking, there would be more leeway to work around these
concepts if no legal authority figures such as professional judges were present.
The hierarchical difference between, for example, a policeman and a university
professor seems to be much less than that between a policeman and a
professional judge, meaning that the policeman may be more candid in
expressing his opinion to the professor than to the judge.

130. See Comment, The Great Democratizing Principle: The Effect on South Africa of Planning a
Democracy Without a Jury System, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 107, 126-27 (1997).
131. See id. (citing Koshi Morita, Lawyers Seek Return of Juries, THE DAILY YOMIURI, Nov. 25,
1992, at 3).
132. See id.
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The all-layperson system would not be without problems, however. To examine the degree to which an all-layperson system would work in Japanese culture, it is useful to first look at the ideals of the jury system in the United
133
States.
According to Samuel Kassin and Lawrence Wrightsman, there are
three ideals behind the idea of jury deliberation in the United States. The first
134
ideal is that of independence and equality.
“No juror’s vote should count
135
more than any other juror’s vote,” and each person contributes his or her per136
sonal opinion. The second ideal is an openness to be influenced by information. Jurors must debate with an open mind and withhold judgment until full
137
deliberation by all of the jurors. “Jurors should scrutinize their own views, be
receptive to others’, and allow themselves to be persuaded by rational argu138
ment.”
The third ideal is that jurors should not be persuaded by irrational
pressures. “No juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or
effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for
139
the mere purpose of returning a verdict.” The reasoning behind this is simple: If a juror changes his vote just to comply with the majority and not because of rational persuasion by new information, his final vote will not reflect
his true beliefs.
Scholars do not agree on whether these ideals are properly achieved in juries in the United States. In one study done by social psychologist Solomon
Asch, American subjects were asked to sit around a table and orally give their
140
opinions on various subjects, one after the other.
Asch instructed the first
five people at the table, who worked for him but acted as subjects, to give an
141
opinion that clearly seemed wrong based on the facts. “Much to Asch’s surprise, the sixth person (and real subject) conformed with the incorrect majority
142
37 percent of the time.” There could be two reasons for this result. First, the
subject could have publicly voted with the majority because he felt pressure to
conform, even though he privately continued to disagree. And, second, the
subject could have reevaluated the evidence, truly changed his mind, and voted
in accordance with his conscience. The first is a danger to the ideals of the jury

133. I am assuming that in adopting an all-layperson jury system, the Japanese would want to maintain these same general ideals.
134. See SAMUEL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 172 (1988).
135. Id.
136. See id. Ideally, the jury is structured to maximize equal participation. Verdicts are to be rendered based only on the evidence before them, and jurors are discouraged from basing their arguments
on private or outside sources of knowledge. To further promote equality, courts often exclude from
service those who might exert undue influence over other jurors, such as lawyers. See id.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4 (1968)).
140. See id. at 174.
141. See id.
142. Id. “Only when this person had an ally were subjects able to resist the pressure to conform.”
Id. (citing SOLOMON ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952)).
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system because it could mean that criminals are being convicted by nonunani143
mous juries. Even in the United States, which has had over 200 years of experience with the jury system, and which is not known as a culture that values
“harmony,” there is a danger that jurors are not expressing their true opinions
in an effort to avoid confrontation.
Nor are jury deliberations in the United States free from hierarchical influences. Many trial attorneys believe that most juries consist of “one or two
144
strong personalities with the rest more or less being followers.” The empirical literature on small group discussions supports this assertion:
“[P]articipation by the individuals is very uneven, and a few people domi145
nate.” Many scholars conclude, therefore, that the ideals are seldom ever re146
alized because of these differences.
Could Japanese society support the three ideals of the Anglo-American
jury system? First, to what degree does the hierarchical nature of Japanese culture allow the Japanese juror to maintain his independence and equality and to
make an informed and rational decision? Because of the lack of empirical evidence, this question is difficult to answer.
American jurors often lose their independence and acquiesce to the views
of the majority even though they privately feel otherwise. Because of the
greater importance of hierarchy in Japanese society, this could be a greater
problem in the Japanese jury. For example, in the United States, those that
“acquiesce” to the opinions of others do so not because American culture dictates that they do so, but because they are shy, have little interest in spending
more time in the jury room, have weak personalities, or for other reasons. In
Japan, a juror could acquiesce for these very same reasons. However, on top of
these noncultural reasons, Japanese culture dictates that one should not contradict his superiors. Therefore, a Japanese juror might adopt a superior’s
opinion because this would be the acceptable behavior in Japanese culture.
Hence, a greater degree of frustration would exist with the ideals of independence and equality among jurors.
In contrast, Japanese “group consciousness” and the desire of Japanese to
maintain “harmony” may have less of an effect on the Japanese jury than one
would assume. Although it is clear that Japanese culture tends to be more
group-oriented than individualistic cultures such as in the United States, the
143. A vivid example of this is the result of a jury trial of a narcotics case in Miami in 1981. In this
case, four defendants were on trial for allegedly having purchased drugs from undercover agents.
During deliberations, the jurors reported they were deadlocked, and the judge instructed them to try
further to reach agreement. Three hours later, they returned with verdicts. The judge then polled
them in open court about whether they agreed in conscience with their decisions. The very first juror
said “no.” After being sent back to the jury room twice, the jurors returned with the same verdicts. It
turned out that some jurors had been pressuring others to agree with them so the jury would reach a
unanimous verdict and allow certain jurors to go on vacation. See id. at 176.
144. Id. at 177.
145. Id. (citing F. Stephan & E. Mishler, The Distribution of Participation in Small Groups: An Exponential Approximation, 17 AM. SOC. REV. 598 (1952)).
146. See id. at 180.
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jury may not fit the definition of a “group” as this word is used in the literature
discussing Japanese culture. A jury composed of twelve randomly selected individuals, although a group temporarily, is by no means an institution or even a
relationship that binds people together. A Japanese would most likely not
identify himself as being part of the group that is the jury because he knows
that once the case is over, the jury will break up and no longer exist. Therefore,
although much literature exists describing the behavior of Japanese when interacting with members of a “group,” it is important to keep in mind that because the jury does not seem to qualify as a typical group, Japanese members of
the jury may behave more individualistically. “Group consciousness” may not
be a threat at all to the effective functioning of the all-layperson jury system in
Japan.
The desire to maintain harmony, unlike Japanese group consciousness, is a
cultural attribute that could strongly influence jury deliberations. A heated issue at present is whether the desire to maintain harmony in Japan extends past
147
the boundaries of one’s immediate group to Japanese society in general.
If
we assume that the cultural trait of maintaining harmony would continue to
exist in the jury room, this could undermine the ideals of independence and
equality, openness to be influenced by information, and persuasion only by the
substance of arguments. In an effort to maintain harmony, jurors might be
willing to give up their personal beliefs and be persuaded for reasons other than
substantive reasons. However, the desire to maintain harmony may be thrust
aside by Japanese jurors, especially if the judge instructs them to do so, and an
open debate could occur where each juror votes his independent mind. Without empirical evidence, it is difficult to say just what part this aspect of Japanese culture would play inside the four walls of the jury room.
B. Japanese Society
Culture is not the only consideration when discussing whether a jury system
should be introduced into a society. One must also look at societal factors such
as level of education, race, citizen participation, and other factors to determine
whether a jury system could function effectively. J.H. Jearey argues that three
148
conditions are necessary for a jury system to function effectively.
First, the
society in which it operates must be for the most part racially, culturally, lin149
guistically, and religiously homogeneous. Second, the members of the society
must be sufficiently educated to understand their responsibilities as jurors and
understand that they must set aside private prejudices when fulfilling these re147. Many scholars claim that the latter is true, and it is for this reason that the rate of litigation in
Japan is so low. However, John Haley, in his piece The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE
STUD. 359 (1978), claims that it is not a desire to maintain harmony that keeps Japanese from suing,
but various logistical factors such as economics and access to courts and lawyers.
148. See J.H. Jearey, Trial by Jury and Trial with the Aid of Assessors in the Superior Courts of
British African Territories: I, 4 J. AFR. L. 133, 143 (1960). Jearey uses these conditions to assess the
reason why the jury system plays such a small part in the African territories under discussion.
149. See id. at 136, 138.
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150

sponsibilities.
Third, the members of the society must generally agree with
151
the laws which, as jurors, they are required to enforce.
The reasoning behind Jearey’s list of conditions is clear. First, the more socially homogeneous a society, the less chance there will be that jurors from that
152
society will base their decisions on racial, religious, or ethnic bias.
Second,
the more educationally advanced a society becomes, the more jurors will be
able to understand their roles and put aside personal views on an issue not
based on the facts and law. Furthermore, better educated juries will be able to
comprehend more complex evidence used at trial directly, rather than through
153
the statements of a zealous attorney or expert. Finally, if jurors do not agree
fundamentally with the laws on which they are supposed to base their decision,
jury verdicts may be primarily based on factors other than the law, frustrating
the concept of rule of law.
Because all three of these conditions are present in Japanese society, it
seems that from a societal perspective, Japan is ripe for the reintroduction of
the jury system. First, Japan is overall one of the most socially homogeneous
societies in the world. Unlike in the United States, where citizenship is determined by place of birth, in Japan, citizenship is determined by the nationality of
154
155
one’s parents.
As a result, except in a few specific instances, almost all
Japanese citizens have the same ethnic and historical background. Also, al156
though most Japanese claim to practice Shinto, Buddhism, or both, few are
serious about religion. Religion neither unifies nor divides the Japanese people—it simply exists neutrally. Finally, Japan has as little linguistic diversity as
can be found in countries in Europe or in different regions of the United States.
Japanese is spoken throughout Japan, with variations in dialect in the North
and the South. Japan is also one of the most educationally advanced countries
in the world. With a literacy rate of close to ninety-nine percent and a rate of
150. See id. at 141.
151. See id. at 135-36.
152. One of the biggest problems with the jury system in the United States is the well-documented
racism of juries. See Nathaniel R. Jones, Race and American Juries—The Long View, 30 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 271, 273 (1997) (“[I]ncreasingly, jury watchers are concluding that . . . race plays a far more
significant role in jury verdicts than many people involved in the justice system prefer to acknowledge.”); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror
Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 66 (1993) (arguing that the influence of jury race discrimination on jury decisions is real and can be measured by judges in certain circumstances).
153. See Comment, supra note 130, at 125 (stating that one reason mitigating against adopting the
jury system in South Africa is that jurors are not considered knowledgeable enough to decide complex
cases).
154. See Onuma Yasuaki, Interplay Between Human Rights Activities and Legal Standards of Human Rights: A Case Study on the Korean Minority in Japan, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 515, 515 n.3 (1992).
155. These include the case of later generations of North and South Koreans whose parents were
brought to Japan against their will during the Japanese occupation of Korea and who were naturalized.
See Comment, Local Public Employment Discrimination Against Korean Permanent Residents in Japan: A U.S. Perspective, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL. J. 197, 201-02 (1998).
156. The total number of adherents to “religion” in Japan in 1993 was 219,723,000. This figure exceeds the total population of Japan because most people belong to both Shintoism and Buddhism. See
STATISTICS BUREAU, GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, 1998 JAPAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 743, tbl. 21-17
(1998) (noting statistics on religious bodies, clergymen, and adherents).
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advancement to universities and junior colleges of over thirty-seven percent,
the pool of jurors in Japan would allow for well-educated juries. And because
over ninety percent of Japanese view themselves as members of the middle
class, criminal defendants would, most of the time, truly be receiving a trial by
their peers. Finally, because Japan follows the rule of law and the Japanese
Constitution puts the power in the hands of the people, Japanese are in basic
agreement with the laws they are required to enforce. If this were not so, these
laws could be changed by democratic means.
A fourth factor that Jearey does not mention that could affect the success of
a jury system is the degree to which a society has allowed or is willing to allow
citizen participation in the system. In countries that have had no experience at
all with citizen participation in the legal system, a switch to either an alllayperson jury system or a mixed court system could be difficult. On the other
hand, societies that have a history of citizen participation in the legal system
may be more welcoming of either type of jury system. Traditionally, Japan did
not offer laypersons an opportunity to participate in the criminal adjudication
process. However, laypersons did have the opportunity to participate in civil
158
conciliation proceedings (chotei) during the Tokugawa period, and they were
159
able to participate on juries during the years 1928 to 1943. During the Allied
Occupation, prosecution review commissions (kensatsu shinsakai) were created
to allow public participation of Japanese citizens to control abuses of prosecu160
torial discretion. There are also various other areas where layperson participation in Japan exists. For example, “laypersons may participate in quasijudicial affairs as civil liberties commissioners (jinken yogo iin), local administrative counselors (gyosei sodan iin), welfare commissioners (min’ei iin), conciliation commissioners, expert commissioners, judicial commissioners, proba161
tion officers, and family court counselors.”
Furthermore, certain scholars have noted a change in “law consciousness”
162
of the Japanese from the 1950s to today.
This change is simply that more
Japanese are willing today to bring their disputes to court than in the 1950s,

157. See Japan Information Network, Rate of Advancement to Universities (visited June 30, 1999)
<http://jin.jcic.or.jp/stat/stats/16EDU72.html> (citing Minister of Education, Science, & Culture, The
Research and Statistics Planning Division, School Basic Survey (Dec. 21, 1998) (university advancement rates); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of East Asian & Pacific Affairs, Background Notes: Japan,
March 1999 (visited June 30, 1999) <http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/japan_0399_bgn.
html> (literacy rate); see also 5 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF JAPAN 260 (Japan Statistical Ass’n, 1987)
(giving comparable statistics from 1985).
158. See Mark D. West, Prosecutorial Review Commissions: Japan’s Answer to the Problem of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 684, 695 (1992) (citing 1 Dan Fenno Henderson,
CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW: TOKUGAWA AND MODERN (1965)).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 64-72.
160. Prosecution review commissions are lay advisory bodies that review a public prosecutor’s exercise of discretion not to prosecute. They are composed of 11 members who are chosen at random
from voting lists. See West, supra note 158, at 694-98.
161. Id. at 695 (citing LAWRENCE WARD BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JAPAN 140 (1984)).
162. See, e.g., Hideo Tanaka, The Role of Law in Japanese Society: Comparisons with the West, 19
U.B.C. L. REV. 375, 384 (1985).
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signaling a more active role for citizens in the system.
The formation of
popular movements, the use of prosecution review commissions in certain
highly publicized cases, and the increase in academic writings and programs
concerning forms of citizen participation evidence the citizen participation that
164
is currently occurring.
Japan’s recent history with layperson participation in the judicial system
will make it easier for the country to readopt a jury system for two reasons.
First, the basic idea of layperson participation in the judicial system is already
accepted in Japanese society, and calling citizens to serve on a jury would not
be a foreign idea. Second, because Japan had a jury from 1928 to 1943, many of
the facilities for jury trial still exist in the old courtrooms. Japan need not go
further than these courtrooms for an example on which to base the design of
new courtrooms.
C. Japanese Legal System
There is no technical legal barrier preventing Japan from readopting the
jury system. The Jury Act was never repealed; rather, it was suspended until
165
World War II was over.
The Japanese Diet could either repeal the Act to
Suspend the Jury Act or enact a new law altogether establishing jury trial for
criminal cases.
From a practitioner’s perspective, the reintroduction of the jury system
would change life drastically. One significant change would be that of timing.
Under the present system, a long trial is not conducted in one continuous sit166
ting. Rather, the case is tried in short sessions, usually for a few hours each
167
month. The introduction of juries would require cases to be tried in one continuous time period, certainly changing the method of preparation of the attor168
neys.
Another significant change would be that a trial by dossier would be re169
placed by bouts of live witness testimony.
The predictability of the old system would be gone. Japanese attorneys would have to learn the art of trying a
case in front of laypersons rather than experienced career judges. The focus
170
will be shifted from the papers to the live witnesses testifying.

163. See id. Professor Tanaka points to large pollution cases in the 1970s as an example. See id.
164. See West, supra note 158, at 715.
165. The Act to Suspend the Jury Act states that “[t]he jury system will be reinforced when the war
is over.” Baishinho no Teishi ni Kansuru Horitsu [An Act to Suspend the Jury Act], Law No. 88 of
1943.
166. See Foote, supra note 9, at 84 (describing this phenomenon in the criminal context); Glenn
Theodore Melchinger, For the Collective Benefit: Why Japan’s New Strict Product Liability Law Is
“Strictly Business,” 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 879, 940 n.11 (1997) (stating that civil trials in Japan are composed of monthly meetings rather than one continuous trial).
167. See Foote, supra note 9, at 84.
168. See Lempert, supra note 4, at 67.
169. See Foote, supra note 9, at 84.
170. See id.
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Adoption of a jury system would also certainly affect the appellate system
in Japan. Presently, a defendant may appeal both factual and legal findings to
171
the first level of appeal (koso appeal).
The Jury Act of 1923 abolished the
172
koso appeal for jury trials on points of fact. Any law readopting the jury system would probably do the same, or risk undermining the factual determinations of the jury. As Professor Lempert states, this “[c]ould fundamentally alter the power relationship between trial and appellate courts, and the rules of
first level review might be similar to the rules that confine the Japanese Supreme Court to questions of law when it reviews intermediate court deci173
sions.” For defense attorneys, the primary effect would be to curtail opportunities for appeal or post-conviction review on factual grounds. However,
presumably the better factfinding by juries would make up for this.
It is also likely that, through the adoption of a jury system in Japan, the near
174
100% conviction rate would decline. Prosecutors may also push for the adop175
tion of a U.S.-like plea bargaining system, which could be used to save the
176
courts time by preventing many cases from reaching the jury.
Also, from a purely practical perspective, although some Japanese courtrooms continue to have jury boxes and jury rooms, the great majority do not.
Certainly the cost and effort of adding such necessities for jury trials, in addition to juror wages and travel, are factors to be considered in how smoothly a
177
jury system could be adopted in Japan.
Thus, although there is no legal obstacle preventing Japan from bringing
back the jury in criminal trials, reintroduction of the jury system would take
time and effort on the part of both the Japanese government and attorneys. At
least one commentator has stated that the need for such efforts, in addition to
skepticism about the jury system, may be enough to prevent adoption of the
178
jury system in Japan in the near future.

171. See id. at 85.
172. See Baishinho [Jury Act], Law. No. 50 of 1923, art. 101.
173. Lempert, supra note 4, at 68.
174. See id. at 67. As discussed supra text accompanying notes 30-33, laypersons may be able to
avoid biases of experienced career judges concerning the presumption of innocence and correctness of
prosecutors.
175. Presently, the Japanese criminal justice system does not allow for plea bargaining. See
Desombre, supra note 29, at 123-24. Prosecutors have discretion whether to prosecute based on the
evidence gathered. See id.
176. See Lempert, supra note 4, at 67.
177. See Marshall S. Huebner, Who Decides? Restructuring Criminal Justice for a Democratic South
Africa, 102 YALE L.J. 961, 975 (1993) (discussing administrative costs such as construction of jury
boxes and deliberation rooms, and juror stipends and travel, in the context of whether South Africa
should adopt the jury system).
178. See Foote, supra note 9, at 85:
[I]n view of all the other elements of the criminal justice system that would be affected by
reintroduction of the jury system, not to mention widespread skepticism of the jury among
judges and prosecutors (as well as some segments of the defense bar), it seems unlikely that
any jury system will be adopted in Japan in the near future.
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VI
CONCLUSION
Japanese jurists and scholars are presently studying various forms of the
jury system around the world to determine which would be most suitable if Japan were to decide to readopt such a system for criminal trials. The probable
success of a jury system in Japanese culture and society would depend entirely
on the details of the system adopted. Obviously, it is necessary to avoid the
many pitfalls of the original jury system used in Japan from 1928 to 1943, such
as nonbinding verdicts and prohibition of objections to the jury instructions.
Factors such as these served to delegitimize the jury system at that time and
greatly contributed to its failure.
Assuming that a legitimate and binding system were adopted, the alllayperson Anglo-American jury system, as opposed to the German mixed court
179
system, seems most suited for Japanese culture. Japanese cultural characteristics such as the hierarchical nature of Japanese society, the high level of trust
for authority figures in Japanese society, Japanese group consciousness, and the
desire to maintain harmony would make it difficult for a mixed court system to
function effectively. If the mixed court system were adopted in Japan, there is
a fear that the laypersons would always defer to the opinions of the judges,
even if not rationally persuaded, thus defeating their purpose. Certainly, the
same cultural factors come into play in an all-layperson jury as well. However,
there is a large difference between disagreeing with a professional judge and
disagreeing with a fellow citizen. In the latter case, a deference to authority
may still exist (such as if the other layperson is much older), but it would be less
pronounced. Therefore, an all-layperson jury would be more successful than a
mixed court in Japan.
From a cultural perspective, therefore, a jury system could be successful in
Japan. None of the cultural attributes serves as a complete bar to the functioning of a jury system. Just as in the United States, the system will not function completely in line with its ideals, but it would still be able to function effectively. Likewise, Japan is ripe for the reintroduction of the jury system from a
societal perspective. Japanese society is, for the most part, well educated, homogeneous, and middle class. These factors would facilitate the functioning
and goals of a jury system in Japan. From a legal perspective, there is no barrier per se preventing Japan from reintroducing the jury system. However, it
may be difficult to convince judges and prosecutors to change the status quo.
Therefore, although it is presently unclear whether the Japanese will reintroduce a jury system in criminal cases, Japanese culture and society, as well as the
Japanese legal system, would be conducive to a jury system, preferably one
based on the Anglo-American model.

179. It is important to note that the cultural characteristics come into play mostly in the deliberation phase of a jury trial, and it is from this perspective that I have formed these conclusions.

